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I. Introduction
Dispute settlement in relations between multinational enterprises and States
has generally been soft-pedalled in many of the recent studies on the control of
multinational enterprises and their role in development. For example, the
report of the Group of Eminent Persons, which may be a convenient starting
point for a study of the subject, not only referred almost exclusively to disputes
arising from nationalization, whereas in fact disputes may arise from a variety
of causes, but also was rather cursory in dealing with the manner in which such
disputes should be approached or settled.' While stating that compensation
should be fixed by mutual agreement or, failing that, by recourse to local legis-
lative and judicial processes, it gave no preference to the settlement by inter-
national tribunals of international legal problems, since it merely referred to
the fact that, "if the parties agree, arbitration can be a good method of settling
the matter."
A. The General Assembly of the United Nations
The General Assembly of the United Nations has really accomplished even
less in its approach to the international settlement of investment disputes.
*M.A.. LL.B., Ph.D., LL.D. (Cambridge, England), LL.M. (Harvard), Ph.D. :Deylon). The
author is a Senior Counsel in the Legal Department of The International Bank of Reconstruction and
Development.
The views expressed herein are not necessarily the views of The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
'See 13 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS (1974) p. 800 at pp. 826 ff.
International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. I
46 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
While also concentrating primarily on nationalization disputes, in 1962 it was
able at least to approve a resolution that:
In any case, where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the
national jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be exhausted. However,
upon agreement by sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the
dispute should be made through arbitration or international adjudication.'
The position had changed radically by 1973 when Resolution 3171 (XXVIII)
declared:
any disputes which might arise should be settled in accordance with the national
legislation of each State carrying out such measures .... I
There was apparently a slight modification of this extreme sovereignty-
oriented view in late 1974 when the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States was formulated, which stated that:
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be
settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless
it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the
principle of free choice of means.4
It is significant that the United Nations General Assembly has never whole-
heartedly advocated international settlement of nationalization disputes by the
International Court of Justice or any other international body such as the
Centre. At best it merely noted that international dispute settlement agreements
or agreements based on such agreements should be honored.
Too much emphasis seems generally to have been laid on nationalization as
a source of investment disputes. While it must be conceded that nationalization
does constitute a major cause of friction, it is worth bearing in mind that com-
pensation is not the only bone of contention between States and investors,
including multinational enterprises. For example, the five cases which are
currently being arbitrated by the Centres do not concern the nationalization of
property but the alleged violation of other obligations involving multinational
enterprises. Indeed, it may well be the case that the obligations allegedly
violated are owed by the investing corporation to the host State. It is really the
whole complex of relations between host States and multinational investors
that is relevant to the regime of dispute settlement.
'Resolution 1803 (XVII), paragraph 4. See U.N. Document A/RES/1803.
'Paragraph 3. See 68 A.J.I.L. (1974) p. 381 at p. 382.
'Resolution 3281 (XXIX) Article 2(2)(c). See 14 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS (1975) p. 251
at p. 255. See Commentaries and Discussion, A Symposium on the New International Economic
Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L LAW 347, 351 (1976).
'See ICSID, Eighth Annual Report 1973/74 p. 4, and Ninth Annual Report 1974/75, p. 5 ff.
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B. The Draft of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
Mention may also be made of efforts by at least one other organization than
the World Bank to deal with dispute settlement. The Organization for Econom-
ic Cooperation and Development (OECD) did produce a draft convention on
the protection of foreign property6 with a section on dispute settlement. While
the object of the draft seems to have been the protection of foreign property
(as opposed to that plus the protection of interests of host States), its section
on dispute settlement does reflect a concern for international dispute settle-
ment machinery.
II. The Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes7
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which came into
force in 1966, established a permanent dispute settlement center. It has a
number of special advantages for host States. Thus, a host State that agrees to
arbitrate a dispute with a foreign investor is assured that the investor's national
State or States may not give him diplomatic protection or bring an international
claim on his behalf.8 The opportunities for intervention by other States in the
affairs of the host State are thereby minimized. Secondly, the host State may
require the exhaustion of local remedies as a condition of its consent to the use
of the Centre. 9 Thirdly, the law applicable in an arbitration is the host State's
unless the parties agree to accept some other law. 10 Fourthly, in view of the
participation of State organs in proceedings under the Centre, the procedural
requirements have been kept flexible to avoid automatically imposing on States
any burdens they might consider unacceptable in view of their special status
as parties to a litigation with a private person. In addition to the foregoing, the
Convention makes it possible for a Contracting State to offer an investor an
invulnerable dispute settlement procedure, without having to submit to some
foreign jurisdiction or undertake an inter-State litigation with the investor's
OThe text is attached to a resolution of the Council of OECD dated October 12, 1967.
'There has been much writing on the Convention and the Centre: see bibliographies in Annexes to
the Annual Reports of the Centre and Centre document entitled Publications about the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (November 1, 1975). Among the more recent and
important contributions are: A. Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nations of Other States, 136 HAGUE RECUEIL (1972) p. 322; C.F. Amerasinghe,
Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, under Convention on the Settlement oflnvestment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States; 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. (1974); C.F. Amerasinghe, Sub-
missions to the Jurisdiction of International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 5
JOURNAL OF MARITIME LAW AND COMMERCE (1974) p. 211; P. Szasz, A Practical Guide to the
Convention on Settlement of International Disputes, 1 CORNELL INT. L.J. (1968) p. 1.
'Convention, Article 27.
'Convention. Article 26.
"Convention, Article 42. See also below.
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State. Finally, the host State also enjoys the certainty that an arbitral award
will be executed in respect of pecuniary obligations by the court of any member
State as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.
From the investor's standpoint, the Convention affords private persons and
corporations the only institutionalized international forum for litigating with
States. A significant advantage for the corporate investor is that the juris-
dictional requirements concerning nationality are not as restrictive as those
under the nationality of the claims rule.II The foreign corporation may further
invoke the jurisdiction of the Centre against the State organs and constituent
subdivisions.I2 They are in a position, though to a lesser extent than States, to
secure execution of an arbitral award against their adversaries.13
Both the host State and the multinational enterprise can ground the dispute
settlement clause firmly in international law so that repudiation of the principal
agreement would not deprive the other party of its or his right to resort to the
Centre. Under the Convention the parties may accept conciliation or arbitra-
tion-or both. 1' There is also the certainty that any proceeding properly
instituted under the auspices of the Centre will actually take place irrespective,
for example, of the failure of the other party to participate in the constitution of
the commission or tribunal or in the proceedings; and in due course that
arbitration proceedings will result in an arbitral award. 15 This certainty may be
expected to cause the parties to reduce both the number and the intensity of any
differences that may arise between them. Provision is also made in the
Convention for a fallback procedure in the event that the parties cannot or do
not agree on a procedure.16 Of interest to claims lawyers is the recognition
that a finding of non liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity of the law
cannot be made by an arbitral tribunal.17
The Convention also enables a State, whose nationals might wish to seek its
protection, to avoid the embarrassment of foreign conflicts by persuading or
otherwise inducing them to rely on the Centre, hence removing disputes from
the inter-government level. 18
A. Considerations Affecting the Centre's Jurisdiction
Because of their constitutional nature, various jurisdictional limitations
cannot be waived by the parties, acting either individually or jointly. Neverthe-
"See Convention, Article 25(2) and C. F. Amerasinghe, loc. cit., BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
"Convention, Article 25(1) and (3).
3Convention, Articles 54 and 55.
"Submission clauses will have to be appropriately and carefully drafted: see C. F.
Amerasinghe, loc. cit., J. MARITIME L. & COM., pp. 216 ff.
I'See below and Articles 48 ff. of the Convention.
"Convention, Articles 33 and 44.
"Convention, Article 42(2).
"Convention, Article 27.
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less, as indicated below, certain of the limitations are drawn with sufficient
vagueness to make it likely that a flexible approach may be taken and
considerable weight given to the agreed interpretation of the parties. In short, in
many instances, it is possible to regard the Convention as laying down only the
outer limits of the Centre's jurisdiction.
With respect to the kind of dispute which may be submitted to the Centre, the
only limitation of importance is that the dispute must be a legal one. This could
be of consequence in the regulation of multinational enterprises. In the Report
of the Executive Directors it is explained that the ". . . expression 'legal
dispute' has been used to make clear that while conflicts of rights are within the
jurisdiction of the Centre, mere conflicts of interest are not. The dispute must
concern the existence or scope of a legal right or obligation. . ". ." There are
some points both of history and interpretation which are worthy of note in this
connection.
The concern of certain States expressed in the course of the formulation of the
Convention-and the interpretation given by the Executive Directors reflected
this-was that the Centre not be used to resolve disagreements about how the
future relationship among the parties to a transaction should be constituted
beyond the framework of the legal instruments to which they had already
agreed. For example, upon the expiration of a concession contract, the Centre
cannot in general assist the parties in negotiating a new agreement. 0 Differences
such as those relating to the payment of compensation upon nationalization or
about the interpretation of tax and customs concessions granted to an MNE or
about an agreed formula for profit-sharing would generally be legal disputes.
Other disputes, in which the host government is more apt to be the moving
party, might involve failures by an MNE to complete a project by a given date,
or to reach a specified level of production, or to train or employ local staff
members.
Nothing in the travaux preparatoires supports the view that the Convention
was intended to exclude disputes on facts from the Centre's jurisdiction. Since
the determination of questions of fact is part of the normal judicial or
semi-judicial function, it is reasonable to interpret Article 25(1) as including
factual questions within the Centre's jurisdiction. Thus, the Centre may easily be
used as a fact finding institution. But there seems to be an obvious qualification
which is inherent in the characterization of the dispute as legal. The facts about
which there is a dispute must be such that a legal right or obligation or the
violation of a legal right or obligation depends on their establishment if the
"Report of the Executive Directors, p. 9.
"
0 See the Address by the Secretary General at the First Annual Meeting of the Administrative
Council, ICSID 1967 Annual Meeting Press Release No. 2 (September 25, 1967).
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Centre is to have jurisdiction. Thus, while the legal principles determining the
amount of tax payable by an MNE may not be disputed, the question of whether
it received certain sums as income as a result of selling its products may be
disputed. On the determination of this fact will depend the exact extent of the
MNE's obligation to pay tax. Hence, it will be within the Centre's jurisdiction to
determine such a fact. On the other hand, if the dispute is about the actions of
an MNE which led to the host State's increasing taxes on corporations doing
business in its territory when there was clearly no obligation owed to the MNE
not to increase its taxes in the manner in which they were increased, this dispute
would not fall within the jurisdiction of the Centre, since the ascertainment of a
legal obligation of the host State would not hinge on its resolution.
An issue raised during the drafting-of the Convention was whether disputes
on legal rights and obligations which were of high political significance were
justiciable.21 An issue of this kind had been raised before the International
Court of Justice, namely, whether a "legal" question with political implications
did fall outside the Court's jurisdiction because it then ceased to be a legal
question. There are, of course, differences between the Court's and the Centre's
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Court took the view that
neither the political implications surrounding the question22 nor the political
motives for submission caused it to become a non-legal question.23 Hence, there
is good authority for stating that, absent an express exclusion in the Convention
itself, a dispute which is otherwise legal would not cease to be legal for the
purposes of the Centre's jurisdiction on account of political significance,
motivation or implications or other political associations or elements. Thus, for
example, a dispute relating to compensation for expropriation would not fall
outside the Centre's jurisdiction on the ground that it had important political
overtones for the host State.
Another question raised during the formulation of the Convention was
whether disputes about rights and obligations under municipal law would come
within the definition of a legal dispute for the purposes of the Centre's
jurisdiction.2" It seems not to have been seriously contested that the Centre
would have jurisdiction over such disputes. Insofar as there is no understanding
to the contrary and the term "legal dispute" is not qualified, it is clear that
disputes about rights and obligations under municipal law are included in the
Centre's jurisdiction.2 5 There is no reason why an arbitral tribunal or
"See 2 HISTORY, pp. 50, 548.
"See (lie First Admissions Case. ibid. at p. 61; Second Admissions Case, 1950 I.C.J. Reports at
pp. 6, 7. See also per Judge Azavedo in the First Admissions Case, 1947-48 I.C.J. Reports at p. 75.
"See the United Nations Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. Reports at pp. 155, 156.
1'2 HISTORY, pp. 322, 498, 838.
'12 HISTORY, pp. 322, 498, 838. Afortiori disputes as to facts on which the ascertainment of rights
and obligations at municipal law is based would be within the Centre's jurisdiction.
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conciliation commission constituted under the Convention as a judicial or semi-
judicial body should not be qualified to decide such disputes. Equally, disputes
about rights and obligations under transnational law 6 would be within the
Centre's jurisdiction.
A further question is whether a dispute ceases to be legal if the solution
sought is not limited to a decision according to legal rules. This may be the
case where the parties agree to seek conciliation under the Convention27 or for
the tribunal to decide the dispute ex aequo et bono. It is clear that the
Convention specifically envisages such situations insofar as it makes provision
for conciliation and arbitral settlement ex aequo et bono.2 8 Hence, it would
seem a contradiction if at the same time the term, legal disputes, excluded such
situations. In short, it seems that all that is needed for the existence of a legal
dispute is that the dispute must consist of a disagreement on legal rights and
obligations, whatever may be the remedies sought.
Much could be said about the scope of the provisions of the Convention
relating to the nature of the parties.29 However, what is of importance is that
both in respect of the public party (State) and the private party (MNE) the
Convention provides for a fairly broad jurisdictional scope.
The Convention envisages, for instance, the party on one side of the
proceedings will be a Contracting State or a constituent subdivision or agency of
such a State. The latter category opens a host of possibilities. It would seem that
the term "constituent subdivisions" would cover municipalities and local
government bodies in unitary states, as well as semi-autonomous dependencies,
provinces or federated states in non-unitary states and the local government
bodies in such subdivisions. That the latter are covered emerges from the fact
that in the Legal Committee constituted to formulate the Convention it was
proposed that the term used be qualified by the description "such as a State,
Republic or Province"; 30 but it was pointed out that this might exclude
municipalities and subdivisions of constituent states or provinces,31 and no
qualification appears in the final version.
The term "agencies," it would appear, was intended to cover as wide a range
of entities as possible. 3" The main limitation would seem to be that the entity
must act on behalf of the government of the State concerned or one of its
"For this concept see J-P. Lalive, Contracts between a State or a State Agency and a Foreign
Company. 13 I.C.L.Q. (1964) at pp. 998 ff. and C. F. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOk
INJURIES TO ALIENS (1967) pp. 115 ff.
"See Chapter III of the Convention
"See Article 42(3) of the Convention.
"For detailed discussion see C. F. Amerasinghe, loc. cit., BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
"°2 HISTORY, p. 856.
"2 Ibid., p. 857.
"2 HISTORY, p. 960.
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constituent subdivisions. It would not seem to matter that the agency belonged
to a political subdivision or that it had a legal personality separate from the
government. Indeed, the use of the term "agencies," as opposed to "instru-
mentalities," may well indicate that it was intended to include under the term
even certain government-owned companies or government-controlled corpo-
rations. On the other hand, mere ownership by the government of shares in
a public company may be inadequate for the entity to qualify as an agency.
Apart from the limitation mentioned above, it may not be possible at this point
in the history of the Convention to define the term exhaustively.
In view of the fact that according to Article 25(1) consitituent subdivisions
and agencies must be designated to the Centre by the Contracting State in order
to have locus standi before the Centre, the importance of establishing precise
definitions for the terms "constituent subdivisions" and "agencies" is largely
minimized. If a Contracting State designates a body to the Centre as being an
agency or constituent subdivision of that State, a strong presumption is raised
that such body is in fact a constituent subdivision or agency.
Concomitantly, it is a requirement that the private party, if a juridical per-
son, as an MNE would be, must be "a national of another Contracting State."
This formulation also leaves open a range of possibilities for the MNE. The
meaning of the term "nationality" in the context of Article 25(2) may not be
identical with the meaning of the term for the law of diplomatic protection. In
the latter field, the purpose of nationality is to establish an adequate link
between the private party and the State giving protection in order to enable the
latter to espouse his claim. In the case of the Convention the role of nationality
serves as a means of bringing the private party within the jurisdictional purview
of the Centre. The capacity to appear is not conditioned by principles governing
the State's right to exercise diplomatic protection.33
In the case of an MNE the requirement of Article 25(2)(b) is that, as a
juridical person, it must have the nationality of a Contracting State other than
the host State on the date of consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre or that if it
has the nationality of the host State, the parties must have agreed that because
of foreign control it should be treated as a national of another Contracting
State.
Since a tribunal or commission constituted under the Convention need not
blindly follow the international law of diplomatic protection in deciding issues
connected with its jurisdiction, it would seem that it can take a more flexible
"It has been said the private party is required to be "a national of a Contracting State" in order to
make it possible to enforce an award against him because his assets would usually be in his national
Stae or because it is required by the principle of mutuality and reciprocity. While this may be true,
such a statement was not intended to mean that nationality should be defined in terms of the
location of assets or any other such criterion.
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approach in deciding what is the nationality of an MNE. It could conceivably
apply some other test than incorporation or registered seat, for example.3 4 If the
first question to be asked, namely whether the MNE has the nationality of the
host State, is answered in the negative, then the next question arises whether the
MNE has the nationality of another Contracting State. In answering this
question the tribunal or commission will be distinguishing between Contracting
States and non-Contracting States.
Whether the application of the "control" test or any other alternative test
would result in the exclusion of one nationality in favor of another, will depend
on whether a tribunal or commission must apply only one of the available tests
to the exclusion of all others in determining nationality; or whether it can apply
several criteria simultaneously with the result that more than one nationality
may be established for an MNE. The question whether an MNE can have more
than one nationality for the purposes of the Convention will be discussed below.
In the event, however, that an MNE must have only one nationality, it is
possible for an adjudicating body to take the position in the case sub judice that
nationality should be attributed according to that test of several applicable tests,
including the "control" test, which will operate in favorem jurisdictionis.
The selection of a single nationality, i.e., between a Contracting and
non-Contracting State, may result in exclusion of the Centre's jurisdiction, if it
is found that the proper nationality is that of the non-Contracting State, or
conversely, jurisdiction would exist if the proper nationality is held to be that of
the other, Contracting State. Of course the parties may certainly agree on the
nationality of the MNE. So long as the choice is not unreasonable, a commission
or tribunal would not interfere with such agreement. Particularly, the parties
may agree that the MNE has a nationality other than that of the host State on
the basis of foreign control. Here, of course, it is only if the condition of foreign
control is manifestly absent that a commission or tribunal would upset the
agreement.
The third, and in a sense the most important, jurisdictional requirement is
that of consent, by both parties, to the submission of a dispute to the Centre.
This is "the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre." 3 The only formal
requirement of the convention is that the consent must be in writing.36 This
freedom as to form means, for instance, that it is unnecessary for the consent of
both parties to be included in a single instrument-though in practice that may
"See also A. Broches, loc. cit., at pp. 360 ff.
"Report of the Executive Directors, p. 8. It has already been noted that, if the party to a dispute
is a constituent subdivision or an agency of the government, its consent must be approved by the
Contracting State concerned, unless such State has already notified the Centre that its approval is
not required.
"Convention, Article 25(1).
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be the most convenient and frequently used method. The consents may, indeed,
be expressed in instruments of completely diverse character, and not necessarily
addressed to the other party or made with particular reference to any dispute or
arrangement with it." Thus, the consent of the host State may be expressed in
some legislative act, such as an investment promotion law, or in a bilateral or
multilateral agreement with the investor's own State. Both these possibilities
have already been used to some extent, and the Centre has issued model clauses
designed for the latter purpose.38 On the part of the investor, a unilateral
expression of consent might appear in the general form in a charter or other
instrument of incorporation, or in a by-law or resolution.
Consent may be in general terms, in a new investment agreement covering
future disputes; or a general consent may be given for a single dispute which has
already arisen. Nor is it significant that the dispute should antedate the
Convention.
B. Choice of Law and Enforcement in Arbitration
1. APPLICABLE LAW
The applicable law aspects of arbitral proceedings under the Convention
leave the parties free by their mutual agreement to determine almost all choice
of law questions. On the other hand, if the parties fail to reach agreement on
any point relating to the choice of law, the Convention does offer a fallback
device to regulate the question, so that once consent covering a dispute has been
given, a partial or even complete lack of agreement on the applicable law cannot
prevent a decision.
Evidently, the most crucial question in many arbitral proceedings is what law
is to be applied by the tribunal. The Convention gives the parties full freedom to
agree on the rules of law to be applied by their tribunal in arbitrating a dispute;
however, if the parties have not reached such an agreement, then the
Convention specifies that the law shall be "the law of the Contracting State
party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of
international law as may be applicable." '39
Because of the potentially decisive effect of the choice of law on the resolution
of any dispute by arbitration, it is quite possible that the parties will, even in the
course of negotiating their initial arrangements, find it most difficult to agree on
an alternative to the fallback provision in the Convention. Nevertheless, the
Convention not only fails to establish any restriction at all as to the legal system
"Report of the Executive Directors, p. 8.
3 Model Clauses Relating to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes; designed
for Bilateral Investment Treaties (document ICSID/6).
"Convention, Article 42(1).
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that may be chosen, constructed or expressly excluded, but even provides that,
no matter what system is accepted by explicit choice, by elimination or through
default, the tribunal is barred from bringing in a finding of non liquet on the
ground of silence or obscurity of the law. 40 Given this degree of freedom and this
assurance, the parties may agree to any one or a combination of a number of
alternatives such as the law of the host State, general principles of law,
international law, and so on.
2. ENFORCEMENT
The enforcement provisions of the Convention give it special significance.
Article 53(1) states that the award is binding on the parties and that each party
shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award. Further the Convention
provides several remedies but at the same time makes it clear that these are the
only remedies. A party may not abide by the award only to the extent that
enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of the
Convention. The three remedies are provided by Article 50 (interpretation),
Article 51 (revision), and Article 52 (annulment).
A request for interpretation of the meaning or scope of an award may be
made by either party. It will, if possible, be submitted to the tribunal which
rendered the award. If this is not possible a new tribunal will be constituted in
accordance with the same provisions of the Convention which governed the
constitution of the first tribunal.
A request for revision may be made "on the ground of discovery of some fact
of such a nature as decisively to affect the award." The fact must have been
unknown to the tribunal and the applicant, and the applicant's ignorance must
not have been due to negligence. The application must be made within 90 days
after discovery and within an absolute limit of three years after the award was
rendered. As in the case of a request for interpretation, it will if possible be
submitted to the tribunal which rendered the award and, if not, to a new
tribunal constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
A request for annulment may be made on one or more of the following
grounds:"' (a) that the tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the
tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the
part of a member of the tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure
from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state
the reasons on which it is based.
'"Convention. Article 42(2).
"Application for annulment must be made within 120 days after the award was rendered, or in
the case of alleged corruption 120 days after discovery, and within an absolute time-limit of three
years.
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A request for annulment will of course not be submitted to the tribunal which
rendered the original award. It will be heard by an ad hoc committee of three
members appointed by the Chairman of the Administrative Council from the
Panel of Arbitrators. The committee may annul the award in whole or in part.
Subject to stays as permitted under the above provisions or to annulment, the
award must be carried out by the parties. Further, Article 54 provides for
enforcement by municipal courts. That Article imposes a duty on each
Contracting State, not merely on the State which had been a party to the dispute
or whose national had been a party to the dispute, but on each Contracting
State to recognize an award as binding as if it were a final judgment of a court in
that State, on the simple presentation of a copy of the award certified by the
Secretary-General. Just as Article 53 affirmed the absolute binding force of the
award on the international law level, Article 54 affirms its external finality, i.e.
vis-a-vis domestic courts. The award is res judicata in each and every
Contracting State.
But Article 54 requires more of Contracting States than recognition of the
award as res judicata. It also requires each Contracting State to enforce the
pecuniary obligations imposed by the award within its territories as if it were a
final domestic judgment and this, too, on the simple presentation of a certified
copy of the award. No State is under an obligation under customary
international law to recognize or enforce foreign judgments and the same is true
of foreign arbitral decisions. States are therefore free either to withhold
recognition and enforcement, or to subject it to such conditions as it may
prescribe. The Convention, however, goes beyond customary international law
in regard to the enforcement of arbitral awards. The obligation imposed by the
same article on federal States is different from that relating to unitary States.
And, finally, Article 55 provides that "nothing in Article 54 shall be construed
as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State relating to
immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution." In other words,
Article 54 requires Contracting States to equate an award with a final judgment
of a domestic court. It does not require them to go beyond that, and to
undertake forced excution of awards in cases in which final judgments could not
be so executed. Article 55 does no more than acknowledge State practice as
regards immunity from execution. Accordingly, the scope of Article 54 will
evolve along with State practice. If a Contracting State now permits forced
execution of judgments against governments in respect of actions jure gestionis
or will permit this at some future time, that Contracting State will have a
corresponding obligation of enforcement with respect to awards made under the
Convention at the relevant time. As is generally known, there already exist a
number of national systems which apply the theory of restricted immunity both
from jurisdiction and execution as regards agencies or instrumentalities of
States.
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C. Conciliation
The Convention makes provision for conciliation as a mode of dispute
settlement. Although conciliation reports are not binding on the parties by their
very nature, this method of dispute settlement may sometimes be preferred to the
less flexible arbitration. On the other hand, where there is a procedure for
conciliation, it is important that such procedure be as effective as possible. To
this end almost all procedural aspects of conciliation proceedings under the
Convention are based on two principles. The first principle is that the parties
are free by their mutual agreement to determine almost all procedural
questions. The large measure of procedural flexibility is a deliberate concession
to the sensibilities of governments, which are traditionally most reluctant to
submit to any established "courts" (even their own), but have generally been
more willing to accept formless procedures which they can shape through
compromissory clauses or ad hoc agreements with the opposing party. The
freedom of the parties to shape the procedure to their own particular
requirements is subject to only two special limitations (aside from those relating
to the procedural devices designed to implement the obligatory jurisdictional
standards): certain unwaivable requirements regarding the composition of
commissions," and the financial obligations of the parties vis- z-vis the Centre,
which obviously cannot be attenuated by any agreement inter se. "
The second principle is that if the parties fail to reach agreement on any point
relating to procedure, the Convention invariably offers a fallback device to
regulate the question, so that once consent covering a dispute has been given, a
partial or even complete lack of agreement cannot prevent the initiation,
conduct or conclusion of the proceedings. It makes no difference that the
parties have failed to agree after efforts made in good faith or that one party
attempts to frustrate the proceeding, or partially or completely refuses to
participate.
The most important aspects in regard to which these two principles are
applicable are dealt with below:"
1. COMPOSITION AND METHOD OF CONSTITUTING COMMISSIONS
The parties may constitute their conciliation commission according to any
scheme they can agree on, provided the number of members of this body is in all
cases odd.4" This proviso cannot be changed or waived even by agreement. The
parties might agree, for instance, on a single member for their commission; or
on three members, one to be chosen by each of the parties and a neutral one to
"Convention, Articles 29(2)(a), 31(2), 56(1) and 3.
'
3Convention, Article 59.
"See further P. Szasz, loc. cit., at p. 27 ff.
"Convention, Article 29(2)(a).
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be elected by those two members; or perhaps there might be five members, two
each to be chosen by the parties and one to be appointed by a specified person or
authority. Should the parties totally fail to agree on a formula, then the
Convention itself provides one that is automatically applicable: a commission
consisting of three members, each party appointing one and a president
appointed jointly.16
2. APPOINTMENT OF CONCILIATORS
The agreement of the parties (or, if there is none, the automatic formula)
would determine whether the several members of a commission would be ap-
pointed by the parties acting individually, or by their joint action, or by the
members previously appointed, or by some outside authority who is to act either
unconditionally or conditionally (e.g., if the parties fail to make certain appoint-
ments). Should there be any breakdown in the appointing process, whether
caused by the failure of the parties to agree on joint appointments, or by the
inability of the appointed members to agree on the election of further ones, or
by the refusal of one of the parties to make the appointments for which it has
sole responsibility, or by the inaction of an agreed outside authority (either
because of an inability or unwillingness to fulfill the conditions established by
the parties, or perhaps because the authority agreed to no longer exists), then
the Convention once more provides an automatic fallback solution. Either
party may after 90 days appeal to the Chairman of the Administrative Council
of the Centre (a position occupied ex officio by the President of the World Bank)
to make any appointments necessary to complete the commission. He must do
so, while observing certain requirements stated in the Convention.47
3. RULES OF PROCEDURE
Procedural agreements reached by the parties are, of course, accorded a high
rank and will, on almost all issues, prevail over those that are used in default of
such agreement. However, the parties should normally have much less reason
to utilize this freedom, since the detailed Conciliation Rules of the Centre have
been carefully designed to be as fair as possible to both parties in most procedural
situations likely to arise. Moreover, uncertainty about what rules are to apply
has been eliminated by providing that, regardless of any changes made after the
date on which the consent agreement entered into force, the Rules to be used
will be those prevailing on such date.' However, the parties may wish to modify
"Convention, Article 29(2)(b).
'Convention, Articles 30 and 31(1).
"Convention, Article 33.
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the standard pattern of the Rules in certain instances. For example, they may
change the time limits for certain acts or agree on special rules of evidence.
In sum, the Convention offers the most sophisticated and flexible framework
available to resolve disputes between States and MNEs. Its provisions also
constitute a useful model for other international arrangements that might be
devised to improve the resolution of disputes between States and MNEs.
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